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injury. Baseline Farms asserted this legal standard was inapplicable
where private parties were acting as private attorneys to enforce state
water and health control standards.
The court disagreed, holding that the applicable water quality
statutes, Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-8-611 and 25-8-612, did not specifically
dispense with the irreparable injury requirement and that this case did
not involve an action undertaken by a government agency pursuant to
a special statutory procedure. The articles here were not intended to
create new rights or to enlarge existing private rights. The provisions
of the articles also did not authorize injunctions or create a private
cause of action to proceed in the public interest. The articles did
recognize, however, that no private rights have been lost by enactment
of the Water Quality Control Act, and water violation determination
should not benefit anyone other than the state. Through this statutory
analysis, it was clear that based on the Colorado Rules of Civil
Procedure, there must be a showing of a real, irreparable injury in
order to support a preliminary injunction. Thus, this court affirmed
the trial court's dismissal of the case.
MichaelSheehan

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Jubilee Hous., Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia Water and Sewer Auth., 774
A.2d 281 (D.C. 2001) (holding the Water and Sewer Authority was not
exempt from following the specific statutory requirement that all rate
changes be preceded by notice and public hearing).
Jubilee Housing, Inc. ("Jubilee"), a non-profit housing
organization, brought this action against the District of Columbia
Water and Sewer Authority ("Authority") following the Authority's
termination of preferential water rates for non-profit housing
organizations. The Authority did not provide a public hearing and
only provided notice to some, but not all, organizations affected by the
termination.
Under section 43-1686 (a) and (b) of the District of Columbia
Code ("DCC"), the Authority was allowed to collect and abate fees and
establish and adjust retail water and sewer rates "following notice and
public hearing." The only issue the Authority raised in defense was
whether the temporary termination of preferential water rates
constituted "establishing" water and sewer rates for purposes of
section 43-1686 (b) of the DCC.
The court held that the termination of the preferential rates did
constitute establishing water and sewer rates under the code and
therefore, the Authority was required to provide notice and public
hearing prior to the termination of the rates. The court reasoned that
the termination of the rates would impose a new obligation on Jubilee
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and others similarly affected, and therefore, the statute required a
public hearing before any change could take place.
Sarah A. Hubbard

FLORIDA
VEX Properties v. S. States Utilities, Inc., 792 So. 2d 504 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (holding the grantee, VLX Properties, acquired property
subject to a flowage easement, to which its grantor agreed by way of a
joinder agreement and, thus, VLX's action for inverse condemnation
must fail).
This case arose out of an inverse condemnation action between the
possessor of a certain property interest and the holder of a flowage
easement across the property. Appellant VLX Properties, Inc. ("VLX")
owned the property, which included a portion of James Pond-the
property at issue in this case. VLX obtained its interest from Lawyers
Title Investment Fund ("LTIF"). However, prior to granting a portion
of the pond to VLX, LTIF conveyed a portion to Glen Abbey Golf
Course, Inc. ("Glen Abbey"). LTIF and other adjacent landowners
retained ownership of the remaining portion of the pond.
For many years Glen Abbey used wells to irrigate the golf course.
However, once reclaimed water became available, Glen Abbey was
administratively prohibited from continuing to draw groundwater and
thus was required to use reclaimed water to irrigate its golf course.
Glen Abbey contracted with Appellee Southern States Utilities, Inc.
("Southern Utilities") to provide the irrigation services. Subsequently,
LTIF conveyed its remaining portion of the pond to VLX.
The reclaimed water flowed over both the portion of the pond
LTIF conveyed to Glen Abbey and that portion which LTIF later
conveyed to VLX. Thus, VLX sought compensation by way of inverse
condemnation because the water was permitted to flow over its portion
of the pond. In essence, VLX contended a dam should have restricted
the water's flow. The primary issue was whether VLX's grantor, LTIF,
agreed to the flowage easement into James Pond. The Florida Court
of Appeals held the facts were sufficient to find LTIF joined in the
agreement between Glen Abbey and Southern Utilities and, thus,
consented to the flowage easement into James Pond. In order to make
this determination the court examined the agreement between Glen
Abbey and Southern Utilities and its effect on contiguous property
owners.
Since Glen Abbey only owned a portion of James Pond, it was
essential LTIF joined in the agreement between Glen Abbey and
Southern Utilities. LTIF also had to obtain flowage easements from all
the other owners of James Pond who were not involved in the
LTIF/Glen Abbey sales agreement. These two requirements were

